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NOTES
Aiavolasiti: A CONFLICT RESOLVED, A CONFLICT IGNORED
To facilitate corporate financing by a bank, five stockholders,
including the plaintiff and four of the defendants, each executed a
continuing guaranty,' making each of them liable in solido with the
corporation for any indebtedness the latter might incur. The cor-
poration issued two promissory notes to the bank,' the first one signed
only by the maker. The five guarantors and a sixth stockholder,
also a defendant, signed the second note as accommodation en-
dorsers. To avoid suit when the corporation defaulted on its obliga-
tions, the plaintiff purchased both notes which were then endorsed
to him by the bank. The plaintiff, claiming that he was a holder in
due course, then brought two suits, later consolidated,' against the
corporation and the other five stockholders, seeking full recovery of
the amounts expended to discharge the debts. The Fourth Circuit
1. Each continuing guaranty provided in part:
"I hereby give this continuing guaranty to the [bank], its transferees or assigns,
for the payment in full, together with all interest, fees and charges ... of any in-.
debtedness or liability . .. of said debtor ... ; I hereby bind and obligate myself,
my heirs and assigns, in solido with said debtor, for payment of any such indebt-
edness or liability precisely as if the same had been contracted and was due or
owing by me in person, hereby agreeing to, and binding myself, my heirs and
assigns, by all the terms and conditions contained in any note or notes . . . to be
signed by [a] debtor, making myself a party thereto and, waiving all notice and
pleas of discussion and division, I agree to pay to [the bank], its transferees or
assigns, upon demand at any time, the full amount of any indebtedness . . .
together with interest, fees and charges .... becoming subrogated, in the event of
payment by me, to the claim of [the bank] ... together with whatever security...
it . . . may hold against said indebtedness . . . ; it being understood and agreed
that this continuing guaranty . . . is exclusive of and in addition to any other
endorsements, guaranties or obligations, with respect to [the corporation], signed
by me or any other guarantor or guarantors separate and apart from this instru-
ment .
Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755, 757 n.2 (La. 1979).
2. The six stockholders, as co-makers, executed a third note in favor of another
bank. The corporation was not a party to this instrument. The plaintiff provided funds
to his son to purchase the note. The son then sued the five defendants on the note.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, however, that the plaintiff was the true party
in interest. The court limited the plaintiffs recovery to one-sixth of the total amount
from each of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to contribution
from the defendants as co-debtors bound in solido, LA. CIv. CODE art. 3058, rather than
as co-sureties, LA. CIv. CODE art. 3058. 371 So. 2d at 760. The court's treatment of this
third note appears sound and will not be discussed further.
3. The trial court consolidated three cases. The third is described in note 2,
supra.
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Court of Appeal reasoned that the plaintiff, as a solidary debtor,
must be limited to contribution from each co-debtor, as provided by
the law of solidary obligations. The appellate court thus included the
corporation as a debtor in calculating the virile share due from each
defendant.4 Amending the lower court's judgments as to the two
notes, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the legal relationship
among "solidary sureties" is governed by the Civil Code's rules of
suretyship. Excluding the corporation from the computation of virile
shares, the court awarded the plaintiff judgments of one-fifth of the
amount he had paid against each of the remaining four guarantors
on the first note and one-sixth against each of his five co-endorsers
on the second note. Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Develop-
ment Co., 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979).
The Louisiana Civil Code defines suretyship as "an accessory
promise by which a person binds himself for another already bound,
and agrees with the creditor to satisfy the obligation, if the debtor
does not."5 Being an accessory contract to the underlying agreement
between the debtor and the creditor,' suretyship gives rise to three
additional legal relationships: (1) surety-creditor;7 (2) surety-debtor;8
and, if there are multiple sureties, (3) surety-surety. The surety's
liability and aspects thereof vary depending upon the nature of the
suretyship agreement."
The creation of suretyship in the context of negotiable instru-
4. Aiavolasiti v. Kurtz, 361 So. 2d 964, 967-68 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), amended
sub nom., Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979).
According to the reasoning of the court of appeal, the plaintiff should have been
awarded judgment against each defendant on the first note for one-sixth of the sum he
had paid and one-seventh against each defendant on the second note. However, though
the court of appeal concluded that a sixth stockholder had not signed a continuing
guaranty and thus was not bound on the first note, the court inexplicably included that
defendant in the calculation of virile shares; the court held that the plaintiff was there-
fore entitled to recovery of a one-seventh virile share from each defendant on the first
note.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3035.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3035. If the principal obligation ceases to exist, the surety
is discharged. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2205. "[Tlhere must be an underlying contract to sup-
port an obligation of suretyship." Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
342 So. 2d 226, 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
Louisiana Civil Code articles 3035-44 specify the nature and extent of suretyship.
Articles 3059-63 deal with the extinction of suretyship.
7. Civil Code articles 3045-51 provide the rules governing the effects of surety-
ship between the creditor and the surety.
8. This relationship is regulated by Civil Code articles 3052-57.
9. The effects of suretyship among the sureties are stipulated by article 3058. Cf.
W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 127-47 (1967)
(relationships under common law suretyship).
10. See text at notes 18 & 29, infra.
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ments may greatly affect the rights and obligations of the surety."
The surety may be bound for the debt itself, which is evidenced by
a negotiable instrument. 2 However, the typical surety for such a
debt is an "accommodation party," "one who signs the instrument
for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it."'" Official
Comment 1 to U.C.C. section 3-415(1) states that "an accommodation
party is always a surety (which includes a guarantor) .... He differs
from other sureties only in that his liability is on the instrument and
he is a surety for another party to it." His rights and liabilities
vary depending on whether he is an accommodation maker, drawer,
or endorser. 5
While the official comments to the U.C.C. imply that suretyship
and the accommodation contract are identical in their legal effects,
there are some practical differences between the two. Typically, the
accommodation party simply attaches his signature to the negotiable
instrument; his rights and obligations are thus determined according
to the provisions of the U.C.C. On the other hand, the surety often
executes a detailed agreement with the creditor, necessitating con-
tractual interpretation by the courts.'" Moreover, negotiable in-
11. See, e.g., F. HART & W. WILLIER, COMMERCIAL PAPER § 13.04, in 2 BENDER'S
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE (1976); W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER 92-93
(1979). See generally Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833, 836-37 (1968).
Louisiana's laws governing negotiable instruments are codified as title 10 of the
Revised Statutes and are known simply as Commercial Laws-Commercial Paper. LA.
R.S. 10:3-101 to -807 (Supp. 1974). The Louisiana legislature adopted substantially all of
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provisions on commercial paper. Prior to
January 1, 1975, the effective date of the Commercial Laws, the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (N.I.L.), codified as Title 7 of the Revised Statutes, regulated commercial
paper. Because the Commercial Laws and the U.C.C.'are virtually identical, reference
hereinafter primarily will be to the U.C.C.
12. In this situation, the surety binds himself by the execution of a written con-
tract, such as a continuing guaranty, which is separate and apart from the debt instru-
ment. A continuing guaranty is considered to be a contract of suretyship in Louisiana.
Brock v. First State Bank, 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1939); Ball Marketing Enterprise v.
Rainbow Tomato Co., 340 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Livingston State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Steel-Tek, Inc., 335 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Blue Bird Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 279 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
affd, 290 So. 2d 302 (La. 1974).
13. U.C.C. § 3-415(1). Accord, LA. R.S. 10:3-415(1) (Supp. 1974).
14. As previously mentioned in note 11, supra, the U.C.C. served as the model act
for the Louisiana Commercial Laws. The Official Comments to the U.C.C. were not
adopted by the Louisiana legislature. However, these comments do provide insight
into interpretation of the Louisiana Commercial Laws.
15. U.C.C. § 3-415(2) provides: "When the instrument is taken for value before it
is due the accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even
though the taker knows of the accommodation." The liabilities of makers, drawers, and
endorsers are stipulated in U.C.C. sections 3-413 and 3-414.
16. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 11, at 95.
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struments law may provide different rules for the accommodation
contract from those applicable to suretyship transactions not involv-
ing commercial paper."
Regardless of the effect of the U.C.C. upon suretyship, the
nature of the suretyship agreement itself modifies the rights and
liabilities of the surety. A simple surety is one who is not bound in
solido with the principal debtor. The simple surety may assert the
rights of discussion, 8 division,'9 and reimbursement2" against the
creditor. The surety may also raise various defenses that negate or
lessen his liability toward the creditor, such as impairment of subro-
gation," extension of time to pay,"2 release of the principal
17. The U.C.C. includes substantive and procedural rules different from those of
suretyship. An example of a substantive difference is the U.C.C.'s requirement that
the accommodated party (principal debtor) actually be a party to the instrument in
order to make accommodation status possible. U.C.C. § 3-415(1). However, suretyship
law does not stipulate that the principal debtor must be bound with the surety on the
same written instrument for the latter's liability to exist. See, e.g., Queen Ins. Co. of
America v. Bloomenstiel, 184 La. 1070, 168 So. 302 (1936). A procedural difference is
that the burden of establishing the liability of an accommodation party is much easier
than proving its existence in a suretyship situation. Under U.C.C. section 3-307, a
holder of an instrument need merely produce the instrument to be entitled to recover
unless the defendant establishes a defense. The holder may, in some cases, then show
"holder in due course" status, cutting off many of the defenses which a defendant may
raise in a typical contract suit. U.C.C. §§ 3-302 & 3-305. See also Peters, supra, note 11;
Comment, Suretyship Law and Negotiable Instruments Law: The Liability of an Ac-
commodation Party to a Negotiable Instrument in Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. REV. 251
(1978).
18. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3045-46. Discussion is "the right of a secondary obligor to
compel the creditor to enforce the obligation against the property of the primary
obligor or, if the obligation is a legal or judicial mortgage, against other property af-
fected thereby, before enforcing it against the property of the secondary obligor." LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 5151. See, e.g., State v. Cousin, 31 La. Ann. 297 (1879); Stinson v.
Hill, 21 La. Ann. 560 (1869); Bernard v. Curtis, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 214 (La. 1816); Nichols v.
Pipes, 353 So. 2d 1086 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
For procedural aspects of the right of discussion, see LA. CODE Civ. P. arts.
5152-56.
19. The right of division, which exists only where there are multiple sureties,
allows a surety to force the creditor to (1) reduce his demand against the former to
only the surety's virile share and (2) seek the remainder from the other co-sureties.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3049-50. See, e.g., John M. Parker & Co. v. Guillot, 118 La. 223, 42
So. 782 (1907); Pecquet v. Pecquet's Executor, 17 La. Ann. 204 (1865); McCausland v.
Lyons, 4 La. Ann. 273 (1849); Filhiol v. Jones, 8 Mart. (O.S.) 635 (La. 1820).
20. The right of reimbursement provides for recovery by the surety from the
creditor if the principal debtor has paid a second time without knowledge that the
surety had previously discharged the debt. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3055.
21. Impairment of the surety's right of subrogation results in a pro tanto dis-
charge. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3061. See, e.g., Dennis v. Graham, 159 La. 24, 105 So. 87
(1925); Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Young, 135 La. 465, 65 So. 611 (1914); Saulet
v. Trepagnier, 2 La. Ann. 427 (1847).
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3063. See, e.g., Calliham v. Tanner, 3 Rob. 299 (La. 1842);
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debtor,23 non-personal defenses of the debtor,2" and bankruptcy.25 Ad-
ditionally, the simple surety may claim the rights of subrogation2"
and indemnity27 against the principal debtor. Finally, if several per-
sons are sureties for the same debt, the surety who discharges the
obligation may seek contribution from the remaining co-sureties for
their virile shares. 8
A second kind of surety, the so-called "solidary surety," binds
himself in solido with the principal debtor. By obligating himself in
this manner, the solidary surety waives the right of discussion.29 He
also waives the right of division if he binds himself in solido with his
co-sureties.0 Thus, solidary suretyship allows a creditor immediate
recourse against the surety for the entire obligation."
A major problem of solidary suretyship is that, because of its
solidary nature and the language of Louisiana Civil Code article
Nolte v. Their Creditors, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 9 (La. 1828); Millaudon v. Arnous, 3 Mart.
(N.S.) 596 (La. 1825).
23. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2205-06 & 3035. See, e.g., Williams v. De Soto Bank &
Trust Co., 192 La. 848, 189 So. 451 (1939); Dickason v. Bell, 13 La. Ann. 249 (1858).
24. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3060. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Compton, 6 Rob. 120 (La.
1843); Johnson v. Marshall, 4 Rob. 157 (La. 1843); Fort v. Cortes, 14 La. 180 (1839);
Baldwin v. Gordon, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 378 (La. 1822).
25. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3043 & 3049.
26. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2161 & 3052-56. See, e.g., Martel v. Rovira, 164 La. 1099,
115 So. 283 (1927); Barnes v. Crandell, 11 La. Ann. 119 (1856).
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3057. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wilson's Executor, 13 La. 138
(1839); Singer Lumber Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 161 So. 327 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935).
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3058. See, e.g., Palmer v. Oscar Dowling Food Products,
Inc., 174 La. 923, 142 So. 127 (1932); Stockmeyer v. Oertling, 35 La. Ann. 467 (1883);
Phillips v. Pedarre, 5 Pelt. 741 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1922).
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3045; Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of Can-
cienne, 140 La. 969, 74 So. 267 (1917); New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Escoffie, 2
La. Ann. 830 (1847); Smith v. Scott, 3 Rob. 258 (La. 1842); Thibodeau v. Patin, 1 Mart.
(N.S.) 478 (La. 1823); Etzberger v. Menard, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 434 (La. 1822); Aston v.
Morgan, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 336 (La. 1812).
30. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2091-94 & 3049. Edward B. Bruce Co. v. Lambour, 123 La.
969, 49 So. 659 (1909); McCausland v. Lyons, 4 La. Ann. 273 (1849); Central Bank v.
Winn Farmers Co-op, 299 So. 2d 442 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert denied, 302 So. 2d 310
(La. 1974).
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3045 states:
The obligation of the surety towards the creditor is to pay him in case the debtor
should not himself satisfy the debt; and the property of such debtor is to be
previously discussed or seized, unless the security should have renounced the plea
of discussion, or should be bound in solido jointly with the debtor, in which case
the effects of his engagement are to be regulated by the same principles which
have been established for debtors in solido.
Since the solidary surety waives discussion and division, he is, in essence, "primarily"
liable together with the principal debtor for the entire debt. Civil Code article 2094
gives the creditor the right to sue any one of the co-debtors bound in solido.
1980]
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3045,32 it is possible that either the rules of solidary obligations3 or
those of suretyship 4 may govern the rights and liabilities of th6
surety. Application of these two sets of principles results in substan-
tially different solutions in suretyship problems. For example, remis-
sion of the debt as to one solidary obligor completely releases the
other obligors unless the creditor reserves his rights against them;
in that event, the creditor is nevertheless bound to reduce his claim
against the remaining co-debtors by the part of the debtor who has
been released.3 5 Alternatively, if the creditor releases the principal
obligor, the surety is discharged; but the remission of the surety's
obligation has no effect upon the liability of the principal debtor.3 6 A
creditor releases a surety by granting to the principal debtor a
modification of the terms of the indebtedness;37 however, a similar
modification as to a co-debtor bound in solido does not release the
other solidary obligors. 8 A paying surety may seek complete indem-
nity from the principal debtor," but a solidary obligor who pays the
whole debt may claim only a virile share from each co-debtor. 4 The
rights of subrogation for a solidary obligor and a surety are also
significantly different.
4
'
Louisiana jurisprudence appears to be settled with respect to
which set of rules applies to the surety-creditor relationship. 41 In a
32. See note 31, supra.
33. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2091-107 & 2203. For an overview of how the courts have
applied these principles to solidary suretyship, see Note, Rights of the Solidary Sure-
ty: Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 36 LA. L. REV. 279 (1975); Note, Security
Rights-Suretyship-Release of the Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge Solidary
Surety, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
34. See notes 7, 8, and 9, supra. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1974-1975 Term-Suretyship, 36 LA. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (1976) (suretyship rules
apply when the surety merely waives discussion but not when he is bound in solido
with the debtor).
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203.
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2205.
37. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3063.
38. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2092, 2095, 2098 & 2100-01.
39. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2106 & 3057.
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2104; Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969);
Wunderlich v. Palmisano, 177 So. 843 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938). But cf. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2106 (seemingly allows solidary surety to seek indemnification from principal
debtor).
41. A solidary debtor is subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the other
co-obligors only for their proportionate part of the debt. Shropshire v. His Creditors,
15 La. Ann. 705 (1860); Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964). A surety can seek the entire debt from the principal debtor through subroga-
tion. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2161 & 3052-53.
42. Previously, there had been two sets of conflicting cases. The first set, an early
line of decisions, rejected an expansive interpretation of the language, contained in
Civil Code article 3045 and its predecessors, which stipulates that the rules of solidary
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recent case, Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte,4a the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the release of the principal debtor,
when accompanied by the creditor's reservation of rights, does not
discharge the solidary surety, the latter having waived his right to
complain of the release." Boutte was significant because the court
for the first time expressly stated that the rules of solidary obliga-
tions apply to the relationship between the creditor and the surety
if solidary language is present.45
With respect to the surety-surety relationship, the applicability
of the law of solidary obligations or that of suretyship has been less
certain. An early case, Leigh v. Wright," suggested that the rules of
suretyship govern the relationship even if the sureties are bound in
solido with the debtor." Dictum in Boutte indicated that "among the
co-obligors . . . bound in solido, the legal relationships may be
governed by the rules of suretyship,"48 with certain exceptions. 9
obligations govern solidary suretyship. These opinions generally held that the solidary
surety was discharged if, without the consent of the surety, the creditor extended the
terms of payment, renewed the debtor's note, sold the debtor's mortgaged property at
a private sale, or, through confusion, became the principal debtor. Brewer v. Foshee,
189 La. 220, 179 So. 87 (1938); Alter v. Zunts, 27 La. Ann. 317 (1875); Jones v. Fleming,
15 La. Ann. 522 (1860); Adle v. Metoyer, 1 La. Ann. 254 (1846).
A later set of cases restricted the suretyship defenses available to a solidary surety,
usually denying him the benefits of Civil Code articles 3061-63. Most of these decisions
focused on the explicit wording of article 3045, ignoring the fact that only the plea of
discussion is mentioned. Bonart v. Rabito, 141 La. 970, 76 So. 166 (1917); Union Nat'l
Bank v. Legendre, 35 La. Ann. 787 (1883); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Blue Bird
Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 279 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Central Sav. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Oil Field Supply & Scrap Material Co., 12 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942); Elmer Candy Co. v. Bauman, 150 So. 427 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
For a general discussion of Louisiana Civil Code articles 3061-63, see Comment, The
Extinction of the Surety's Obligation, 23 Loy. L. REV. 539, 550-61 (1977).
43. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
44. Id. at 278. For an excellent criticism of this case, see The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Suretyship, 36 LA. L. REV. 437 (1976).
45. 309 So. 2d at 278.
46. 183 La. 765, 164 So. 794 (1935). In Leigh, the Louisiana Supreme Court indi-
cated that a solidary surety was entitled to contribution from his co-sureties if he
could prove that payment to the creditor prior to the bringing of a lawsuit was made
with the knowledge, concurrence, and consent of the other co-sureties. On remand, it
was determined that the co-sureties had known of, but had not consented to, the pay-
ment; thus, the plaintiff was denied recovery. Leigh v. Wright, 192 La. 224, 187 So. 649
(1939).
47. 183 La. at 770-71, 164 So. at 795-96.
48. 309 So. 2d at 278.
49. The court noted that sometimes the relationships among solidary sureties are
not governed by the rules of suretyship. 309 So. 2d at 279. A solidary surety may pay
the debt before being sued and still preserve his right of contribution. Bond v. Bishop,
18 La. Ann. 549 (1866); Ferriday v. Purnell, 2 La. Ann. 334 (1847). A simple surety
must wait until he has paid "in consequence of a lawsuit instituted against him." LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3058.
19801
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However, in a recent decision, Gauthier v. Scott,0 the first circuit,
ignoring Leigh and the dictum in Boutte, held that a solidary surety
could seek contribution from his co-surety only under the principles
of solidary obligations, not those of suretyship." Gauthier thus im-
plied that, in the case of solidary suretyship, the rules of solidary
obligations apply to all three relationships: surety-creditor, surety-
debtor, and surety-surety. In effect, the holding extinguished the
solidary surety's right of indemnity from the debtor, as provided by
Civil Code articles 2106 and 3057.52
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court expanded on
the Boutte dictum and expressly ruled that the surety-creditor and
surety-surety relationships created by solidary suretyship are
governed by different codal principles, thereby restricting the effect
of article 3045 to the surety-creditor relationship." With respect to
the first promissory note, the court of appeal, recognizing that the
guarantors had bound themselves in solido with the debtor, relied
on article 2104 in concluding that the plaintiff's recovery must be
limited to the virile share of each co-debtor (including the corpora-
tion).54 The supreme court stated, however, that it was an over-
simplification of the relationship between the principal debtor and
the individual guarantors to view them as co-debtors in solido for all
purposes.55 Pointing out the accessory nature of the contract of
suretyship56 and applying Louisiana Civil Code article 3058,"7 the
court awarded judgment against the co-sureties for contribution of
50. 327 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 314 (La. 1976).
51. In Gauthier, the plaintiff, a solidary surety by reason of his execution of a con-
tinuing guaranty, sued his co-surety for contribution under Civil Code article 3058 for
one-half of the amount he had paid in discharging a corporate note. The first circuit
awarded the plaintiff recovery of a one-third virile share each from the co-surety and
the corporate debtor. The court reasoned that the benefits of article 3058 were not
available to a solidary surety, permitting the plaintiff to seek contribution only under
article 2104, applicable to solidary debtors.
52. Logically, if the plaintiff was allowed to collect only one-third from his co-
obligor, the corporation, in contribution, it does not seem that at the same time he
would be entitled to full recovery from the corporation. The Gauthier holding thus
runs contrary to Louisiana Civil Code articles 2106 and 3057.
53. See note 31, supra. Louisiana Civil Code article 3045 is contained in the sec-
tion entitled "Of The Effects of Suretyship Between The Creditor And The Surety"
and mentions only those two parties.
54. 361 So. 2d at 967.
55. 371 So. 2d at 758.
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3035.
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3058 provides:
When several persons have been sureties for the same debtor and for the same
debt, the surety who has satisfied the debt, has his remedy against the other sureties
in proportion to the share of each; but this remedy takes place only, when such person
has paid in consequence of a lawsuit instituted against him.
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their one-fifth virile shares (excluding the corporation from the
calculation of the virile shares).58 This remedy did not affect the
plaintiff's right of indemnity from the principal debtor. 9
As to the second note, the appellate court, as did the Gauthier
court, again applied the rules of solidary obligations to the surety-
surety relationship."0 The supreme court amended the lower court's
decision, holding that the rules of suretyship govern this situation."1
Accordingly, the plaintiff was awarded judgment against the five co-
sureties for contribution of their one-sixth virile shares; as with the
first note, the corporation was excluded from the computation of the
virile shares. The Aiavolasiti court imposed liability on the four
defendant-guarantors by reason of their execution of the guaranty
agreements, while casting in judgment the fifth co-surety, who was
not a guarantor, because he had signed the note as an accommoda-
tion endorser. 2 The note was not discharged by the plaintiff's pay-
ment to the creditor, 3 thereby creating the possibility that the fifth
defendant might be liable as a prior endorser to the plaintiff. 4 How-
ever, the court concluded that the presumption of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 7:68, that the endorsers are liable in the order in which
they endorse, was rebutted by the evidence. 5 The court also evi-
dently disallowed recovery of the note's stipulated rate of interest
and attorney's fees. 6
58. 371 So. 2d at 758-58. Generally, attorney's fees are not awarded except where
authorized by statute or contract. Nassau Realty Co. v. Brown, 332 So. 2d 206 (La.
1976); Hernandez v. Harson, 237 La. 389, 111 So. 2d 320 (1959); Moses v. American
Security Bank of Ville Platte, 222 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). Likewise, interest
is awarded only at the legal rate if it is not stipulated in the contract. LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 1936, 1938 & 1940. But since the continuing guaranties (contracts) were assigned
to the plaintiff, the interest and attorney's fees stipulated in those agreements should
have been awarded.
59. 371 So. 2d at 758-59.
60. 361 So. 2d at 967-68.
61. 371 So. 2d at 760.
62. Id. at 759.
63. LA. R.S. 7:119-21 (1950, repealed 1974). The court examined the N.I.L. to
determine the liability of the sixth stockholder (who did not sign a continuing guaran-
ty).
64. LA. R.S. 7:68 (1950, repealed 1974) provided: "As respects one another, in-
dorsers are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse; but evidence is ad-
missible to show that as between or among themselves they have agreed otherwise.
Joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and several-
ly." Cf LA. R.S. 10:3414 (Supp. 1974) and U.C.C. § 3-414 which are to the same effect.
65. 371 So. 2d at 760. For an example of the type of evidence needed to rebut the
presumption, see Gulf Nat'l Bank of Lake Charles v. Computer Analysis, Inc., 278 So.
2d 827 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
66. If the note was not discharged, the plaintiff should have been able to collect
the note rate of interest and attorney's fees. See Rothschild v. Bowers, 2 Rob. 380 (La.
1842); LA. R.S. 7:121 (1950, repealed 1974). Accord, U.C.C. §§ 3-601(3) & 3-603(2).
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Aiavolasiti thus allows a surety the benefits of the Civil Code
articles on suretyship in his claims against the principal debtor and
his co-sureties despite the solidary nature of his obligation toward
the creditor. In this respect, Gauthier 67 is implicitly overruled. It is
submitted that the Aiavolasiti court correctly perceived the ac-
cessory nature of suretyship68 and the varying effect of solidarity
among debtors and sureties upon the three separate legal relation-
ships. Had the supreme court accepted the rationale of the court of
appeal and the Gauthier court, the paying surety would be at a dis-
tinct disadvantage. 9 First, if the surety were considered solely a co-
debtor in solido, entitled to recover only the principal debtor's virile
share, the basic notion that suretyship is an accessory obligation
would be severely undermined."0 Denial of the right of indemnity to
the surety is inimical to the idea that the principal debtor ought to
pay the creditor, since the surety incurs his obligation for the
benefit of the debtor." Second, the solvency of the principal debtor
would be of extreme importance in the calculation of virile shares
due from the co-sureties in contribution. 2 Third, the co-sureties
would benefit by a reduction of the amount for which they are liable
to the paying surety. 3
Aiavolasiti also greatly expands Leigh's interpretation 1 of Civil
Code article 3058."M The solidary surety now seemingly possesses the
67. See text at note 50 supra, and note 51, supra.
68. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3035.
69. The courts should not interpret the law so that sureties will find it beneficial
to delay in performing their obligations. To the contrary, the law should encourage
sureties to promptly pay the debt to the creditor, if no valid defense exists to pay-
ment. Aiavolasiti rewards the surety who is willing to pay by allowing him contribu-
tion under Civil Code article 3058.
70. Obviously, a principal debtor who is required only to pay a virile share to a
surety is, in reality, merely a co-debtor with the latter. See notes 51-52, supra.
71. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2106, 3035 & 3057.
72. If contribution is only available under article 2104, then all solidary co-debtors,
including the corporation, have to be included in the calculation of virile shares. An im-
portant exception to this general rule is that the loss occasioned by the insolvency of
one solidary debtor must be equally shared by the remaining solvent co-debtors. Thus,
the solvency of the corporation in Aiavolasiti would greatly affect the size of the
sureties' virile shares, if the reasoning of the court of appeal was accepted. However,
in contribution under the law of suretyship (article 3058), the principal debtor is not in-
cluded in the calculation of virile shares and thus the solvency of the corporation is ir-
relevant.
73. If treated as solidary co-debtors, the co-sureties would be responsible only for
their virile shares as co-obligors under Civil Code article 2104, not as sureties under
article 3058. To illustrate, utilization of the rules of solidary obligations would allow
the plaintiff to recover only one-sixth virile shares from each co-surety, instead of the
one-fifth shares as awarded by the Aiavolasiti court with respect to the first note.
74. See notes 46-47, supra, and accompanying text.
75. See note 57, supra.
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right of contribution from his co-sureties even if they did not con-
sent to his discharge of the debt."6
The most significant aspect of Aiavolasiti is the court's failure
to indicate the proper resolution of the conflicts between the Civil
Code articles on suretyship and the Negotiable Instruments Law
(N.I.L.)" that arose in its deliberation as to the second note."8 In par-
ticular, the Louisiana Supreme Court offered no explanation of its
unusual treatment of the five defendants. No justification appears to
exist for imposing liability on four defendants as sureties, rather
than as accommodation endorsers."
When the underlying obligation is evidenced by a negotiable in-
strument which the "sureties" have signed as "accommodation en-
dorsers," analysis of the surety-surety relationship varies depending
on whether the Louisiana Civil Code or the U.C.C. is utilized. Dif-
ferences are possible in the following instances: (1) a co-surety's
liability based on the order of endorsement of the instrument, (2) a
paying surety's right of subrogation against his co-sureties, (3) the
possibility of deficiency judgments against co-sureties, and (4) a pay-
ing surety's recovery of attorney's fees and note interest in an ac-
tion for contribution.
Assume for the purposes of illustration that three "sureties," A,
B, and C, sign in that order, as accommodation endorsers, a typical
promissory note,"0 binding themselves in solido with the debtor, D.
Aiavolasiti's treatment of the sixth accommodation endorser on
the second note (the only defendant who did not sign a continuing
guaranty) as a surety' implies that A, B, and C are all sureties.
Thus, if B paid the debt of D upon the latter's default, and B sues A
and C. an application of the rules set forth in the instant case
76. 371 So. 2d at 758-59 n.7.
77. Since the second note was executed prior to 1975, the N.I.L. was the ap-
plicable statutory law. See note 11, supra.
78. The court understandably did not consider the N.I.L. applicable to the first
note since none of the defendants had signed it. See LA. R.S. 7:18 (1950, repealed 1974)
which states: "No person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear
thereon." Cf. U.C.C. § 3-401(1) which is to the same effect. With respect to the issues
involved in the instant case, no substantive differences exist between the N.I.L. and
the U.C.C.; thus, future discussion will employ the latter.
79. As previously mentioned, the Aiavolasiti court treated the four defendants
who were accommodation endorsers on the second note as guarantors (i.e., sureties) by
virtue of their execution of continuing guaranty agreements. It is contended that the
defendants should have been considered accommodation endorsers for the reasons
listed in the text starting at note 105, infra.
80. A typical commercial note includes language providing for (1) solidary liability
among the makers, endorsers, guarantors and sureties; (2) waiver of presentment for
payment, demand, division and discussion; and (3) stipulated attorney's fees.
81. 371 So. 2d at 759.
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results in A and C being liable in contribution for their one-third
virile shares.
If the U.C.C. is applied, however, any surety who signs the in-
strument must first be considered an accommodation endorser.
Thus, the above solution is only correct if the presumption that en-
dorsers are liable to one another in the order in which they en-
dorse82 is rebutted. Since B could pay off the creditor without
discharging the note,83 it appears that if A did not present parol
evidence to rebut the presumption, B could collect the full amount
he paid from A.84 Moreover, C would be entirely discharged from his
liability on the instrument by virtue of the rule of reacquisition.85
Therefore, depending on which law is applied, an accommodation en-
dorser can obtain either contribution (under Civil Code article 3058)88
or full reimbursement from previous endorsers (under the U.C.C.)."7
Suppose that in addition to signing the promissory note, A, B,
and C also execute continuing guaranty agreements in favor of the
creditor. Upon payment to the creditor, B becomes subrogated to
the rights of the creditor.8 Thus, if A and C are treated as
"sureties" because of their status as guarantors, it would appear
that B is only subrogated to the rights of the creditor on the guaranty
instruments.88 To the contrary, if A and C are considered accommo-
dation endorsers, B would seemingly be subrogated to the creditor's
82. U.C.C. § 3-414(2) specifies: "Unless they otherwise agree indorsers are liable to
one another in the order in which they indorse, which is presumed to be the order in
which their signatures appear on the instrument."
83. U.C.C. § 3-601(3) stipulates:
The liability of all parties is discharged when any party who has himself no
right of action or recourse on the instrument
(a) reacquires the instrument in his own right; or
(b) is discharged under any provision of this Article, except as otherwise pro-
vided with respect to discharge for impairment of recourse or of collateral.
But an accommodation party has a right of recourse on the instrument against the
party accommodated and any prior endorser. U.C.C. §§ 3-415(5) & 3-414. Therefore, the
note is not discharged. Cf. Gleason v. Barrilleaux, 292 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974); Cook v. Crow, 194 So. 455 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (same result under the N.I.L.).
84. See note 82, supra, See also Redden v. Lambert, 112 La. 740, 36 So. 668 (1904);
Prestenbach v. Mansur, 14 La. App. 429, 125 So. 310 (1st Cir. 1929).
85. U.C.C. § 3-208. The rule is that when an instrument is reacquired by a prior
party, any intervening party is discharged as against the reacquiring party and subse-
quent holders not in due course; he is also discharged against holders in due course
with notice (e.g., cancelled endorsement).
86. See note 57, supra.
87. See note 82, supra.
88. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2134, 2161-62 & 3053.
89. Typical guaranty agreements provide for this right. See note 1, supra. How-
ever, the surety also has a right of subrogation by law. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2161(3).
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rights on the note itself." This analytical difference substantially
affects the procedural requirements by which B may impose liability
on A and C.9 The ability to collect from the co-sureties may
therefore depend greatly upon the court's use of either the codal
rules of suretyship or the U.C.C."
Another problem not addressed by Aiavolasiti is that of the
liability of accommodation endorsers for deficiency judgments. Loui-
siana's deficiency judgment statute93 provides that when a creditor
provokes a judicial or private sale upon foreclosure on the debtor's
encumbered property without appraisal, he thereby loses any fur-
ther remedy against the debtor for a deficiency judgment, even if
there exists a contractual waiver of appraisement. 4 The statute
specifically states that in such a situation "the debt . . . shall stand
fully satisfied and discharged."95 Upon paying the debt to the credi-
tor, B would be subrogated to the former's rights against the debtor, D.
B could foreclose upon any mortgage without an appraisal, but this
action would bar any further remedy against D.9" Applying the rules
of suretyship,9 7 it appears that a surety might also be discharged by
a foreclosure without appraisal, a conclusion reached by the first cir-
cuit in Simmons v. Clark." However, despite the recognition that
"an accommodation party is always a surety,"99 the Louisiana courts
have consistently held that accommodation parties are not entitled
to protection from deficiency judgments,' even if the debtor is dis-
90. See note 83, supra. If endorsers A and C have not been discharged and they
have waived presentment and notice of dishonor, the note may be enforced against
them by holder B. U.C.C. § 3-414(1).
91. See note 17, supra.
92. See note 17, supra. Both sets of laws may apply in some circumstances (but
not necessarily with equal force). Section 1-103 of the U.C.C. stipulates that general
principles of law (e.g., suretyship law) shall supplement the U.C.C. unless displaced by
its particular provisions. Accord, LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) (provides that the
"other laws of Louisiana" shall supplement the Louisiana Commercial Laws).
93. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950 & Supp. 1952); 13:4107 (1950).
94. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950 & Supp. 1952); 13:4107 (1950).
95. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950 & Supp. 1952).
96. See text at note 94, supra.
97. See note 6, supra.
98. 64 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953). A reasonable contrary view is that the
defense provided by the deficiency judgment statute is merely a personal defense of
the debtor. If so, the surety could not raise the defense in a suit for a deficiency judg-
ment. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 3036.
99. U.C.C. § 3-415, comment 1.
100. Southland Inv. Co. v. Motor Sales Co., 198 La. 1028, 5 So. 2d 324 (1941); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Soileau, 323 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Commercial Credit
Equip. Corp. v. Larry Parrott of Gueydan, Inc., 212 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 252 La. 895, 214 So. 2d 719 (La. 1968); Gumina v. Dupas, 178 So. 2d 291 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 La. 442, 179 So. 2d 430 (La. 1965); The Farmerville
Bank v. Scheen, 76 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
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charged by virtue of the deficiency judgment statute. Therefore, in
a suit for contribution, B could obtain deficiency judgments against
A and C if they were considered accommodation endorsers.1
Finally, application of the provisions of the U.C.C. would allow B
to recover the note's stipulated rate of interest and attorney's fees
from his co-sureties. 2 However, if the accommodation endorsers, A
and C, are treated as mere sureties, B's action for recovery would
be based on law, as provided by the suretyship rules, and not on
contract; therefore, he would be entitled only to legal interest.1"3
As the above discussion indicates, serious conflicts exist be-
tween the rules of suretyship and the U.C.C. as to the liability of a
solidary surety on a negotiable instrument. One writer has advo-
cated that the courts "harmonize" the two bodies of law in light of
the intent of the parties in each individual contract." ' It is submit-
ted that such a subjective approach to a confusing area of the law
will only provoke inconsistent decisions.
A preferable solution would be to recognize the U.C.C. as the
paramount law governing the rights and liabilities of accommodation
parties. Any codal rules of suretyship which are not inconsistent
with the U.C.C. should be consulted in appropriate cases."5 This ap-
proach can be justified for a number of reasons. First, according to
civil law theory, the latest expression of the legislative will should
predominate."0 Second, Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-103"07 im-
plies that the legislature intended a preemptive application of the
U.C.C. provisions. Third, the law governing negotiable instruments
101. See note 100, supra.
102. A note is not discharged when a surety pays off the underlying debt. See note
83, supra.
103. 371 So. 2d at 758. As previously mentioned, this conclusion of the court
appears incorrect. See note 66, supra.
104. Comment, supra note 17, at 273.
105. One writer has concluded that the U.C.C. is a true code and that civil law
methods and techniques should be used to decide doubtful cases. Thus, reference to
laws outside the U.C.C. should be made only where the U.C.C. indicates that those
laws should apply. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 291. For a survey of the possible methods of reconciling the U.C.C. with other
state laws, see Nic'kles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform
Commercial Code-Part I. The Methodological Problem and the Civil Law Approach;
Part I. The English Approach and a Solution to the Methodological Problem, 31 ARK.
L. REV. 1, 171 (1977).
106. The suretyship articles date at least from their incorporation into the Civil
Code of 1870. The Commercial Laws (ie., the U.C.C.) were adopted in 1974.
107. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this title, the other laws of Louisiana shall apply." The comment to this
section states in part: "The thrust of this section is that the rest of Louisiana law
implements the Commercial Law if a situation is not covered by the Commercial Law."
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is one of specialized application and, thus, ought to be the primary
guide to decision making in this area. Fourth, despite the admirable
desire of Louisiana to preserve its civil law heritage, uniformity of
decisions in the area of negotiable instruments will serve to stabilize
interstate business transactions involving commercial paper. °8 In-
deed, the legislature's adoption of U.C.C. section 1-1021°9 compels
this conclusion.
While Aiavolasiti correctly settles the question of which Civil
Code provisions apply to the relationship between solidary sureties,
it leaves unresolved the proper utilization of negotiable instruments
law in regard to suretyship. It is hoped that the Louisiana Supreme
Court will clarify this troublesome area in its future opinions.
J.P. Hebert
THE CLASS ACTION AS A CONSUMER PROTECTION DEVICE:
State v. General Motors Corp.
The defendant sold over 1,400 Oldsmobiles with substituted
Chevrolet engines to Louisiana consumers, allegedly without disclos-
ing the substitution. Claiming violation of the Unfair Trade Prac-
108. Adoption of Article 3 [of the U.C.C.] by preserving a core of uniformity
for Louisiana should facilitate the multi-state transactions in which these in-
struments function....
.... Louisiana, at long last, [is brought] into a position of sharing with her
sister states a useful portion of the major benefits of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.
.... On balance there is much that may be pointed to in Louisiana [sic]
new Commercial laws as representative of progress in the quest for certainty
and uniformity.
Message from Paul M. Hebert, Dean, LSU Law School, in R. HERSBERGEN, COMMER-
CIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS IN LOUISIANA: THE COMMERCIAL LAWS
v to vii (1974).
109. LA. R.S. 10:1-102 (Supp. 1974) provides:
(1) This Title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its pur-
poses and policies.
(2) The purposes and policies of this Title are
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to promote uniformity of the law among the various jurisdictions.
